```
H4J5mccC
      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
1
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
 2
3
      JAMES PAUL McCARTNEY,
 4
                     Plaintiff,
                                               New York, N.Y.
5
                                               17 Civ. 363 (ER)
                 V.
6
      SONY/ATV MUSIC PUBLISHING,
      LLC, et al.,
 7
                     Defendants.
8
9
                                                April 19, 2017
10
                                                10:00 a.m.
      Before:
11
12
                            HON. EDGARDO RAMOS,
13
                                                District Judge
14
15
                                 APPEARANCES
16
17
      MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP
           Attorneys for Plaintiff
18
      BY: MICHAEL A. JACOBS
           J. ALEXANDER LAWRENCE
19
           ROMAN A. SWOOPES
20
      PRYOR CASHMAN, LLP
21
          Attorneys for Defendants
      BY: TOM J. FERBER
22
          DONALD S. ZAKARIN
23
24
25
```

(Case called)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Counsel, please state your name for the record.

MR. JACOBS: Good morning, your Honor. Michael Jacobs from Morrison & Foerster. With me is Roman Swoopes and Alex Lawrence.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. ZAKARIN: Good morning, your Honor. Don Zakarin from Pryor Cashman for Sony/ATV, and with me is my partner Tom Ferber.

THE COURT: And good morning to you, all.

This matter is on before me for a pre-motion conference on the defendant's request for leave to file a motion to dismiss on a number of grounds, however this is the first time that this case is before me. So, Mr. Jacobs, let me give you the opportunity in the first instance to tell me a little bit about your case.

You can remain seated or use the podium; however you feel most comfortable.

MR. JACOBS: Thank you, your Honor.

The Copyright Act has a very powerful provision granting authors the right to terminate their, any grants that they made prior to the extended term that starts in year 56 of a copyright term. Section 304 says that the author has the right to terminate that grant notwithstanding any agreement to

the contrary. The Sony/ATV defendants here, through a subsidiary in the U.K., managed to work an end-run around a similar provision of the Copyright Act, Section 203, that deals with a slightly different period of the copyright term that is being terminated, and they filed suit against the Duran Duran group in the U.K., arguing to the U.K. Court that U.K. contract law trumps the provision of the Copyright Act allowing the author to terminate the grant of the copyright in the extended term at issue there. The U.K. Court ruled that it didn't really have the provisions of the Copyright Act under U.S. law properly before it and applying U.K. contract law ruled that U.K. contract law trumped and that it would be a breach of the contract that assigned — that Duran Duran used to assign its copyrights, it would be a breach of contract if they exercised their U.S. copyright termination rights.

Parenthetically, the termination right at issue here only applies to U.S. copyrights, it doesn't apply to, for example, U.K. copyrights or copyrights arising under any other national copyright law.

THE COURT: So, what are we talking about then here?

I mean, as I understand it these copyrights, the rights
thereunder were assigned or granted in the U.K., correct?

MR. JACOBS: They were granted under -- let's assume for present purposes that the agreements in question are U.K.-governed agreements in which in the '60s The Beatles, more

precisely McCartney and Lennon, assigned their copyrights and their compositions to publishers, and then publishers assigned to publishers, and now it is with Sony/ATV.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JACOBS: So, with the Duran Duran decision behind them, the Sony/ATV representatives, speaking with McCartney's representatives said, in words or substance, we have a claim against you, we have a threat against you, we have a potential theory that can trump your otherwise valid exercise of your termination rights. Various words were said that led McCartney's representatives to think soon or at some point McCartney would be sued in the U.K. for exercising his termination rights.

So, to try and figure out whether there really was a claim here letters were exchanged. We wrote, and said: We have exercised our termination rights. We have sent you these termination notices. Do you dispute them? Were they rightfully exercised? Letter back: We don't dispute the validity of your terminations under the Copyright Act. Letter back: But you didn't answer the second part of this, were they rightfully exercised or do you have a claim for breach? Answer back: Well, we may or may not have a claim for breach. It all depends on what happens in the Duran Duran case. We are not saying we are going to sue you, we are not saying we will not sue you, we won't give you a promise we won't sue you. There

is a possibility, therefore, that we will sue you.

And so, with that exchange of letters, we filed a declaratory judgment action before your Honor.

THE COURT: Assuming there is a breach, when does it accrue?

MR. JACOBS: That's a very good question.

The Copyright Act, this whole termination provision is very finely crafted in the copyright Act. The terminations become effective, the first one becomes effective next year for "Love Me Do," the 1962 Beatles Song. They then roll out in 2018, 2019, 2020, etc., over time.

The claim of breach could accrue anticipatorily, I suppose, now. This is really a U.K. law question, right? Does U.K. contract law have a claim for anticipatory breach?

Because we have sent out the termination notices and we regard them and they regard them as legally effective termination notices. So, that act has been accomplished.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Explain to me why, if the notice is valid and they acknowledge that the notice is valid, how they can have a claim of breach of contract down the line?

MR. JACOBS: This is the real live disagreement before your Honor. Our view is that under the "notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary" language, there can be no claim of breach. Their view is that -- you can see it in the letter

before you, we really have a disagreement about what law controls here. We are asking for a declaration from your Honor that U.S. copyright law answers the beginning and end of this question and that with the "notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary" language, there can be no claim of breach.

Now, that doesn't answer all the litigation that might flow from these very valuable rights. Let's say they go to Zimbabwe and file a suit under Zimbabwe law and say, under Zimbabwe law there is a claim, Zimbabwe law is written that says any time anybody anywhere in the world exercises a termination right there is a breach of Zimbabwe law.

I use this, obviously, just to set up a hypothetical here. The fact that we may get a ruling from your Honor -- I am sort of anticipating where you may go here -- doesn't answer all the questions that might arise in this dispute between the parties, but with a ruling from this Court that Section 304 means what it says and that "notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary" means notwithstanding any agreement under any potentially applicable law, then we will have accomplished our objectives for the moment before your Honor.

THE COURT: So, if I rule in the way that you ask, the U.S. rights will be determined but can you still be sued for breach in the united Kingdom?

MR. JACOBS: We believe that if we get such a ruling from your Honor, we will have potentially claim or issue

preclusion defenses. Conceivably if Sony/ATV sued us in the U.K. we could be back before you saying, your Honor, they're trifling with your jurisdiction here. You ruled there is no claim of breech, they're going elsewhere to pursue a claim of breach.

So, there are various possibilities for heading off such a lawsuit were it to be brought. Number one, the declaratory value of this would be very significant. There is plainly confusion about how this provision of the Copyright Act should be applied under foreign law by foreign courts and a clear declaration from your Honor that, as to U.S. copyright law Section 304 is the beginning and the end of the answer, it would go a long way toward resolving this matter.

THE COURT: Where, from your perspective, is the Duran Duran case, procedurally?

MR. JACOBS: It is on appeal.

THE COURT: And what can happen? What is the range of outcomes that can happen and how does that affect your case here?

MR. JACOBS: I am uncertain of the full range of potential outcomes under U.K. procedure. On appeal,

Duran Duran will argue that the High Court misapplied the material before it on Section 203, the corresponding provision of the Copyright Act that is at issue there -- I am nearly certain -- and they will argue that the High Court got it wrong

in concluding that it misunderstood U.S. copyright law or it misapprehended the effect of that under U.K. contract law principles. I imagine that is what they will argue and, conceivably, they could be successful.

The lower court, the so-called High Court ruling reads in the nature of an evidentiary conclusion that U.S. law was not properly adduced. The threat to us is that with the effective date coming soon, it's time to start thinking about how these rights will be exploited post-termination effective date. And with this cloud hanging out over us that we may be sued in the U.K., we have a cloud on our title. In a sense this is sort of like a quiet title action where we want to quiet the title to the extended term of copyright for which the concededly effective termination notices have been set.

THE COURT: Can I truly quiet title? I mean, if there is this question as to how the copyright laws interact with the laws of the United Kingdom -- and, why are we here, by the way?

MR. JACOBS: We are here because this is a U.S. defendant. We have an issue of U.S. copyright law. Very strong copyright policy in favor of authors, very clear provisions, and they have told us that while they regard the termination notices as effective, they are not conceding that those termination rights were rightfully exercised as a matter of an agreement they say is to the contrary.

THE COURT: Was any relevant or any document that is

at issue in this case, any contract, any grant of a right, were any of those executed here in the United States?

MR. JACOBS: I don't believe -- I wouldn't want to double check, your Honor, but our theory does not rest on the fact that the instruments themselves are U.S. law instruments.

THE COURT: They were entered into, presumably, as early as 1962, at in the case of "Love Me Do?"

MR. JACOBS: That's right, your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there only one song associated with each termination notice or multiple?

MR. JACOBS: Multiple songs are -- the notices are prescribed under the copyright office regulations and I believe some of the notices contain multiple songs. There is a window during which you can transmit the notice, it gets recorded in the copyright office. After the copyright office reviews it -- and yes, the notices that were sent have multiple songs associated with them.

THE COURT: Is the legal issue at play in the Duran Duran action the same as the legal issue in this case?

MR. JACOBS: Very close. Close enough that our adversary here wishes to hold out the prospect that if

Duran Duran goes their way, they could sue us for breach in the U.K. The language in 203 is the same, it is "notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary." It is a different period of copyright that's terminated and, of course, if we were

litigating this in the U.K. the agreements are different, they were entered into at different times. Particularly here, the extended term at issue was enacted first with the '76 Copyright Act, so the assignments at issue here could not have been entered into in anticipatory grant of the extended term. The extended term didn't exist.

So, let me just give you sort of the decision logic that we propose for this case.

This is a question of U.S. law. The Copyright Act says you don't need to look to conflicts of laws principles to decide this case because it says notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary and the ruling we seek is that ruling, that U.S. law controls here, U.S. law says notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, that means notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary regardless of where it's entered into.

They have argued and will surely argue that, actually, to get the ruling we seek of no breach, you would need to treat questions of U.K. contract law. That's their pitch to you.

Our argument is no, you don't need to, but if you do, we will prove to you that as a matter of U.K. law properly considered, U.K. law would defer to U.S. copyright law on this question. There is a famous case called Campbell Connelly in the U.K. that stands for that principle.

THE COURT: Would we have to wait until the resolution

of the appeal in the Duran Duran case to see whether or not that's the case?

MR. JACOBS: I think this case arises now and so we would do our best to prove to you what U.K. law holds on this question.

The Duran Duran High Court said we don't properly have U.S. copyright law before us so we are just ruling on U.K. principles. But, the reason I went off on this path is that we would also argue to you that as a matter of proper contract interpretation, given the fact that these grants were entered into before the extended term existed, there can be no claim of breach. Again, we would adduce, if we were in this alternative world where we are looking at U.K. law, we would adduce U.K. interpretive principles to address that question.

But, our view is you don't need to go down that path. Sort of forecasting for you the way briefing may occur, we may not get a threshold ruling from you that I don't need to consider U.K. law. So, you may see a brief from us that says our view is U.S. law answers all the questions here but should your Honor disagree or should your Honor want to hear more, here is "the more" about how this would properly be treated under U.K. law because we are asking you for quiet title to these terminated rights.

THE COURT: I guess I may have asked this question in a slightly different way, but why isn't there acknowledgment

that these termination notices are valid enough for you?

The

H4J5mccC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. JACOBS: What we would need from them is an acknowledgment that they are valid and rightfully exercised, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, just like the copyright law says. That's what they haven't given us. They have not given us a covenant not to sue. They have not said we are not going to see you in the U.K. no matter what. What they are asking you on this proposed motion to dismiss, they're asking you to let them hold out the threat of litigation in the U.K. and not adjudicate the declaratory judgment we have brought in the U.S. That, to us, just seems like a -- it has to be a logical contradiction under declaratory judgment jurisprudence. It can't be that they can hold out a threat of litigation and then say to you there is no ripe dispute. know how to end this case. They can grant us a covenant not to sue. THE COURT: Mr. Zakarin or Mr. Ferber, why don't you grant them a covenant not to sue? And you can remain seated, too, by the way, if you wish. Whatever makes you more comfortable. MR. ZAKARIN: I sit all day so I figure if I have a chant to stand I might as well. THE COURT: Sure.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

Let me answer that question first and address it.

MR. ZAKARIN: I am more accustomed to it.

first thing they ask is would you acknowledge that the termination notices are valid and were properly exercised under Section 304. And we acknowledge that. They didn't ask for anything more. They then ratcheted it up, and you can see in the exhibits to the complaint, the correspondence went back and forth. Then they said we want you to agree to waive, for all time, any possible suit for breach of contract under these contracts in the U.K. that you may have. And what we said to them is we have no intention of suing. We have no plan to sue. And, in any event, it is way premature because the law in the U.K. on this issue is unsettled and we don't know what Duran Duran is going — that was even before Duran Duran had entered the judgment. It has since been appealed.

So, it is premature. We said we have no intention of pursuing you, it is premature in any event, we have every hope of working with you. There is no contemplation of bringing a case but not to waive, not to absolutely, categorically, under all conditions waive any theoretical potential right that may exist under U.K. law. We have not waived absolutely, unconditionally, any theoretical right that may or may not come to exist in the future.

THE COURT: But do I understand this correctly? Do I understand your acknowledgment of the validity of the termination notices to mean that the plaintiff has an absolute right to take back whatever rights he may have given up?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. ZAKARIN: That is his Congress-given right under Section 304. They have a right to terminate grants that were previously made. These were U.K. grants between '62 and '65 to predecessors of Sony/ATV made by Lennon, made by McCartney. Sony/ATV has obtained into the extended renewal term, the John Lennon share of the compositions. Sony/ATV will continue to have the rights in both the Lennon share and the McCartney share outside of the United States for the full duration of copyright outside of the United States. We are only dealing with the United States. And we have acknowledged he has the right to terminate. That's in the statute. He has the absolute right. What they are asking is a pure U.K. issue, U.K. law issue: Is it a breach of contract? In other words, is there some compensable right in damages by virtue of my having terminated these U.K. contracts in the U.S.? I frankly don't know what the answer will be from the Duran Duran case. I don't know that whatever that answer may be would fully settle this issue. I do know that Sony has no intention of bringing a case against McCartney in the U.K., certainly not here, but if there were a case to be brought, it would be a U.K. case because it is a U.K. contract. The copyright issue is separate. There is no cloud on

The copyright issue is separate. There is no cloud on McCartney's rights. By the way, he can't transfer those rights to any song. The earliest he can transfer, whether it is to himself or anybody else other than Sony/ATV is, I believe, for

the first song -- "Love Me Do" -- in October 2018, a year and a half from now. That's the earliest he can convey it to anybody else. The other songs --

THE COURT: So, let me ask this so that I understand.

MR. ZAKARIN: Sure.

THE COURT: If he does that, if the termination is valid, it terminates your rights as of 2018 here in the United States. Can you still sue him in the U.K. if he attempts to enforce that termination?

MR. ZAKARIN: In theory -- in theory -- a case could be brought for breach of contract and any damages suffered thereby. In theory.

THE COURT: Only in the U.K., not in the U.S.

MR. ZAKARIN: It is a U.K. contract and the parties were U.K. parties. Normally it would be the U.S. entity that would be saying, hey, I can't be sued in the U.K., I'm here. This is Sony/ATV, which is here. Mr. McCartney is a U.K. citizen. He can sue Sony. He could have brought this case, by the way, right now in the U.K. for a declaration, although I think he would be premature bringing it in the U.K. as well because think of all the contingencies that haven't occurred:

The Duran Duran case has not been determined on appeal. The Duran Duran case, itself, may be factually or it may be distinct as a matter of evidence. We don't know what the decisions will be and if they get through those three

contingencies in terms of just the Duran Duran case, then it's does Sony/ATV have any real intention of suing? It has been the exact opposite, they have said we don't, we don't have any intention of doing it.

That's why we believe, putting all else to the side, there is no declaratory judgment here. It is so unripe, it is so premature because there is not an existing concrete, certain justiciable controversy. We have said the exact opposite.

THE COURT: There also seems to be no dispute as to what Lord McCartney rights would be in the U.S.

MR. ZAKARIN: Correct.

THE COURT: So, why don't you give him a covenant not to sue in the U.S.?

MR. ZAKARIN: Because we don't have an intention to sue in the U.S. We wouldn't sue under the Copyright Act. The question is — the question is — would his termination of Sony's rights in the U.S., which he has the right to do, would that be a breach of the underlying contracts in the U.K. exposing McCartney to some theoretical damage claim. I don't know that it does. That's the honest truth. I don't know that it gives rise to such a claim. And, as I said, I don't know what is going to happen with Duran Duran and I don't know that Duran Duran is going to be fully dispositive, but I believe that what they are asking is for an absolute covenant not to sue or a waiver, which I think is (a) premature, I think there

is no reason why that should be given to begin with; and I'm not sure, by the way, I'm not sure that there is going to be any claim that ever exists in the U.K. under the law and they are asking your Honor, as we said in a very premature way, to, in effect, render an advisory opinion as to what you think the U.K. law on this subject, which is at the very best unsettled, there is one case that has addressed this precise issue which is the High Court decision in Duran Duran which is now on appeal.

So, it's a completely unsettled issue under U.K. law and they're asking, in effect, your Honor, to determine U.K. law.

THE COURT: Is there another level beyond the appellate court that the case is currently before, the Duran Duran case?

MR. ZAKARIN: You mean can it be taken up above that?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ZAKARIN: The answer is I don't know, your Honor.

I don't think so but I don't profess to be an expert on the

U.K. judicial system, I am barely familiar with this judicial system.

THE COURT: And what law applies in this case?

MR. ZAKARIN: In this case?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ZAKARIN: I don't think there is an issue of

copyright law in this case at all because the issue of copyright law here is do they have the right to terminate? Yes. Have they validly exercised that right to terminate? Yes. Will those terminations become effective on the dates stated in their termination notices under Section 304? Yes. That disposes of the copyright issue. Then the sole issue is, is doing so, under U.K. law, a breach of the contract. And that issue, as I have said, is a U.K. issue that we have no intention of pursuing regardless of the outcome of the Duran Duran case which itself is uncertain, premature, and even if it is upheld on appeal, doesn't necessarily determine whether this would be a breach of contract under these contracts under U.K. law.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Did I understand you to say that even if it is determined that under U.K. law you have a cause of action for breach of contract in the U.K., you are not — it is not your current intention to enforce that right?

MR. ZAKARIN: Correct. We have said that. We have said that clearly that we have no intention at the current time — and I don't know that it will ever change but we are not prepared to forever waive that right, but we have said we do not have any present intention, regardless of what the outcome of the Duran Duran case is, of bringing a breach of contract case in the U.K. We are not prepared to forswear that right for all time. I can't speak to the future, what may

happen five years from now, three years from now, but I can say and I know the management and I have spoken with the management of Sony, they don't have any intention of initiating a breach of contract case against Mr. McCartney upon the effectiveness of the termination of "Love Me Do" or the next song, or the next song, or the next song, or the next song. They have no intention of doing that.

So, this is, as I have said, a very premature case and it's a case that is not a justiciable controversy warranted by the positions of the parties.

THE COURT: I guess a couple of questions on ripeness.

I guess there is, on the one hand, the question of U.K. law and whether it is sufficiently settled at this point and what, if any changes, may come about as a result of the Duran Duran case but there is also the question of the termination date. So, there is an actual date that is before us that is not that far in the future where -- I mean, I understand the quiet title example and why shouldn't Mr. McCartney be entitled to ask a Court for some level of comfort that his rights are acknowledged, it is my understanding, by every party in this room, that they will not be tampered with.

MR. ZAKARIN: Well, if I can, his title is not being questioned. His ability to convey his rights starting in 2018 is not being questioned. That's the effectiveness of your

termination notices are valid, your exercise of the right is valid and the termination would be effective when it becomes effective which is the effective date. As I have said, he can't convey to anybody but Sony/ATV until the effective date of each termination notice.

THE COURT: But I guess it's small solace to say well, you can convey it to anyone after the termination but we are going to sue you.

MR. ZAKARIN: I understand that that is the theoretical risk that exists but that's not what a declaratory judgment is to eliminate and indeed the Dow Jones case which is one of the cases we cited to your Honor is dead on and, indeed, that was even further advanced because Dow Jones actually got sued for libel in the U.K. and the Court still dismissed it as being unripe because of the uncertainty, to a great extent, of what U.K. law really was on the issue; and (b), because there is no indication, indeed, there was a contrary indication that Dow Jones would be sued or any judgment obtained in the U.K. would be pursued here.

So, that case is even closer to being a ripe case and the District Court said this isn't ripe. And there are issues of uncertain U.K. law and the Second Circuit affirmed that.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Jacobs.

MR. JACOBS: Briefly, your Honor.

To be clear, we are not asking you to decide U.K. contract law. We are asking you to decide that under U.S. copyright law, the "notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary" language means regardless of where that contract is entered into. It is a very powerful doctrine.

The cases have, for example, in the Ray Charles case,
Ray Charles did a deal -- the ray Charles estate did a deal
with the heirs and said we are going to give each of you
\$500,000 but you can have no claim of any kind against the
foundation that was set up. The heirs then exercised their
statutory termination rights. The Ray Charles foundation said
that's fine, they're valid, they're validly exercised, but we
hold out the prospect of getting our \$500,000 back. The
District Court in that case said no matter how you cut it, what
they're trying to do is get around the "notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary" language. And the threat that you
might lose your \$500,000 bequest is enough to give rise to a
dispute and, more importantly for purposes of the holding, Ray
Charles Foundation cannot get that \$500,000 back. Under state
law principles that contract arguably should be enforceable.

So, it is a very powerful doctrine here. And to merely transport the dispute to U.K. law doesn't change how powerful the doctrine is, nor does it change what we are really asking you to decide, that as between these parties before this Court under U.S. Copyright Law, there is no claim of breach and

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

U.S. law controls.

If they were right that their whole theory was that they're asking to you decide a question of U.K. law, they could stipulate to judgment now as to the effectiveness of 304 under U.S. Copyright Law and the notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary because, in their view, that doesn't answer any of the questions. For us it answers nearly all the questions and that's all we are asking you to decide.

THE COURT: I guess you are here because you want to avoid litigation later but here we are in litigation so why not wait and see how things play out?

MR. JACOBS: Because this is a very clever maneuver by a holder of rights who wants to improve its negotiating position and exercise leverage over Paul McCartney by holding out the threat of litigation in a claim of breach. They're not willing to grant a covenant not to sue even though this is so theoretical, so uncertain. They're not willing to give us the legal certainty that any licensor would need, any owner of rights would need to go out and exploit his rights. There is a threat not only against Paul McCartney of a claim breach, there is a claim, potentially, for tortious interference that might lie against the parties that negotiate with him. And so, the sole and exclusive reason we are before you is to resolve legal uncertainty that they have created over what should be a very clear exercise of statutory rights.

THE COURT: Thank you.

I think the threshold question for me is whether or not to grant leave and I think leave is certainly appropriate in this case. The assertions, the arguments that are being made by the defendants are not wholly without merit and may indeed be colorable, so you will be granted leave to file your motion. How much time do you want?

MR. ZAKARIN: Normally I would not ask for much time.

I am in the middle of -- I just finished a trial last week in

Washington, I have got four weeks to get in findings of fact in
this case which is a six-week trial, so I would only ask maybe
by the first week in June, if that's possible. I know that's
late.

THE COURT: That's about six weeks, that's fine.

Mr. Jacobs, how much time to respond?

MR. JACOBS: We will take four weeks, your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well. So, the first Friday in June and four weeks after that, and then I will give you two weeks to reply.

MR. ZAKARIN: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. JACOBS: Your Honor, can I raise a related issue?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. JACOBS: It is a matter of your procedure and how it would work in a situation like that.

We think we could crystallize the dispute before your

Honor as well as demonstrate that their theory is without legal merit by filing a very early motion for summary judgment. We think the Copyright Act, the statutory language is clear, the cases are clear, and it would make very sharp for you exactly what we are asking you to decide and how we are asking you to decide it.

Is that something you would consider? Is that something that we should submit a letter brief on and set another conference?

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Zakarin?

MR. ZAKARIN: If I can, your Honor, it seems to me that our motion is primarily a jurisdictional motion which is the first thing to be determined in any case anyway, whether the Court should take subject matter jurisdiction over this case which is the ripeness argument. So, in terms of ordering it, a summary judgment motion would seem to follow thereafter. And if your Honor held that you have jurisdiction, I assume we would be filing an answer to the complaint and if they wanted to then move for summary judgment, I don't have a problem with that, but I think doing it at this time is premature.

THE COURT: Right. I mean, I would have to determine the jurisdictional issues as a threshold matter in the first instance and I don't know whether we gain anything by having you file those papers now. So, why don't we hold off on that.

MR. JACOBS: Thank you, your Honor.